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  Traders are dying to make money.  That's all they care about.  Most traders don't care about the diplomacy that you
see in the corporate environment. They don't care about titles.  They are here to make money.  They live in a four-
by-four foot space and put up with all the bullshit that goes on around them.  They put up with a lot, but the money
is worth it. . . . *302 On Wall Street there is no "working your way up."  You have a good year, make a million
dollars.  You're a hot shot. [FN1]
I A Rogue Trading Primer
  A rogue trader is a market professional who engages in unauthorized purchases or sales of securities, commodities
or derivatives, often for a financial institution's proprietary trading account. [FN2]  Most readers, whether or not
they realize it, already have some familiarity with rogue trading, due to the many highly publicized rogue trading
losses that have fascinated the media and infiltrated popular culture in recent years. [FN3] For example, Nicholas W.
Leeson, who lost $1.4 billion at Barings Bank, [FN4] Robert Citron, who lost $1.5 billion of Orange County's funds,
[FN5] and Toshihide Iguchi, who lost $1.1 billion of Daiwa Bank's capital, [FN6] *303 are all well-known rogue
traders. [FN7]
  It is important to recognize, however, that these well-publicized rogue trading incidents are neither new nor
isolated events. [FN8]  In fact, one early rogue trading case in 1884 involving two partners at Grant & Ward who
illegally rehypothecated securities that had already been posted as collateral for margin purchases caused a national
panic and a scandal involving former president Ulysses S. Grant, a partner at the firm. [FN9]  Since that time,
numerous rogue traders have lost billions of dollars of their employers' capital, generating a pop culture fascination
with such events, [FN10] as well as congressional hearings, [FN11] regulatory and legislative proposals, [FN12] and
changes and modifications to many firms' *304 internal compliance programs. [FN13]
  For example, Joseph Jett was the chief government bond trader at Kidder, Peabody until April 1994, when the firm
reportedly discovered that Jett had exploited an accounting loophole to credit himself with $350 million in profits
from fictitious trades, earning him a $9 million bonus in 1993.  Jett's real trades had actually generated $100 million
in losses for the firm.[FN14] Howard A. Rubin was head of mortgage securities trading at Merrill Lynch until the
firm discovered Rubin's 1987 losses of $377 million due to mortgage backed securities trading.  Due to these losses,
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") suspended Rubin from the securities industry for nine months in
1990.  He subsequently joined the firm of Bear, Stearns. [FN15]
  Paul W. Mozer was head of the government bond trading desk at Salomon Brothers until August 1991, when
Salomon management discovered that he had attempted to purchase more than the firm's purchase limit at U.S.
Treasury auctions by submitting false bids in the name of Salomon customers.  Mozer was fired, barred from the
securities industry for life and sentenced to four months in prison.  Salomon was forced to pay nearly $290 million
in fines and several members of senior management, including Chairman John H. Guttfreund, resigned. [FN16]
  Yukihusa Fujita was the former general manager of the finance department at Showa Shell Sekiyu K.K., a Japanese
subsidiary of Royal Dutch/Shell, who lost $1.06 billion in unauthorized currency trading.  Showa's chairman and
president resigned after the news of Fujita's losses was disclosed, as did two of Fujita's superiors who failed to report
their knowledge of the illicit trades. [FN17]
  Collectively, along with other "rogue traders," these individuals lost billions of dollars of their employers' capital,
inspired newspaper and magazine articles, books, and movies about their illicit activities and, in some cases, caused
the downfall of the *305 once-venerable firms that employed them.  Although much has been written in both
popular and academic circles about recent rogue trading scandals, most of the accounts to date have focused on the
individual traders and institutions involved.  Such a focus, I argue in this Article, overlooks valuable lessons
concerning the causes of rogue trading losses.
  Rogue trading is particularly mysterious given both the extensive legal regime and formal institutional policies
designed to prevent it.  A wide array of state and federal laws, regulatory rules and SRO (self-regulatory
organization) guidelines mandate that financial institutions adequately supervise their employees. [FN18]  The "duty
to supervise" provision of the Securities Exchange Act is representative of such guidelines.  Section (4)(E) of the
1934 Act authorizes the SEC to suspend or revoke the registration of any broker/dealer that "has failed reasonably to
supervise, with a view to preventing violations of the provisions of [the 1933 or '34 Act, either of the 1940 Acts, the
Commodity Exchange Act, or any rule or regulation under any of these statutes], another person who commits such
a violation, if such other person is subject to his supervision." [FN19]  Additionally, the statute provides that the
supervisory requirement will be deemed met so long as procedures reasonably designed to detect and prevent
violations have been implemented. [FN20]  Similar provisions are contained in the Commodity Exchange Act and
the SRO rules. [FN21]
  *306 Financial institutions have implemented elaborate compliance procedures and programs in an apparent
attempt to fulfill these supervisory requirements. [FN22]  Many firms spend millions of dollars on expensive
computer and reporting systems and on supervisory personnel designed to curb abusive trading practices. [FN23]
Other firms have attempted or considered alterations to their compensation systems in an effort to deter irresponsible
trading behavior. [FN24]
  The continued existence of rogue trading in the face of these extensive legal and institutional prohibitions presents
a mystery for many scholars and industry observers.  If firms are comprised of rational, risk-averse wealth
maximizers who, by definition, behave in a manner that enhances their own self- interest, then why does
management permit its employee-traders to behave in a manner that jeopardizes not only the continued existence of
the firm (and, correspondingly, of management employment), but also jeopardizes the integrity of the markets in
which the firm operates? [FN25]
  Most analyses of rogue trading losses to date have focused on *307 faulty internal controls as the culprit and have
concluded that firms will quickly learn from well-publicized rogue trading losses and voluntarily increase their
oversight and supervision of traders, because these actions are in the firms' economic best interests. [FN26]  In this
Article, I argue that most commentators have underestimated the benefits of rogue trading to traders, management
and, arguably, shareholders.  I further argue that the costs to management and shareholders of prohibiting rogue
trading have been underestimated.  Accordingly, a cost-benefit analysis reveals that the continued existence of rogue
trading in the face of pervasive legal rules providing incentives for firms to curb such behavior indicates that
financial institution management has made a conscious decision to foster an institutional culture that encourages at
least some rogue trading.  Consequently, market forces cannot be expected to eliminate rogue trading, because
eliminating the conditions that give rise to rogue trading is not in the best interest of traders, managers, or, perhaps,
of shareholders.
  The conclusion sets out an agenda for future research on the topic of rogue trading.  First, the theories set out in
this Article as *308 to the causes of rogue trading should be empirically tested.  Second, the data collected in that
empirical test should be compared and contrasted with the available data on conspiracy, cover-up, and rogue
behavior in other types of organizations. Third, further analysis should be devoted to the issue of whether
government regulation to prevent rogue trading is necessary or desirable.
II The Trader's Story
  In determining the causes of rogue trading, it is useful to distinguish two separate types of rogue trading.  Financial
institutions typically set both risk limits and loss limits as a part of their internal risk management system.  In other
words, most firms are comfortable allowing traders to assume risks only within specified limits, the idea being that
no single actor should be permitted to endanger the firm's continued existence. Similarly, most firms are willing to
accept losses from a single trader only within specified maximum limitations before actions are taken to mitigate the
trader's losing positions.
  Accordingly, rogue traders may be individuals who exceed the firm's risk limits, individuals who attempt to exceed
the firm's loss limits by concealing losing trades, or both.  Nicholas Leeson of Barings, for example, exceeded the
firm's risk limits, then hid his large losses. [FN27] Toshihide Iguchi of Daiwa, on the other hand, engaged only in
low-risk spot market trades in U.S. Treasury securities, but he managed to hide his mounting losses from his
employer for nearly eleven years, accumulating a large deficit in the meantime. [FN28]
A. The Trader's Cost/Benefit Analysis
  It is important to recognize that many, if not most, of a trader's attempts to evade his employer's risk and loss limits
are rational and predictable behavior. [FN29]  In fact, the motivations to evade the firm's risk and loss limits are so
great that to fail to attempt such *309 evasion is arguably irrational.  A trader's incentives to hide losses or fabricate
profits are obvious.  Because larger trading profits result in a larger bonus, traders can enhance their own wealth and
welfare by fabricating profits.  Similarly, when trades go sour, the trader has an incentive to hide those losses from
his superiors, hoping to recoup the loss later, perhaps by engaging in riskier trades in an attempt to catch up. [FN30]
  Traders also have incentives to evade the firm's risk limits.  The first, and most obvious, reason is simple greed, a
term that is not intended pejoratively.  To paraphrase Gordon Gekko, greed, within limits, can be good. [FN31]  The
quest for personal wealth can enhance productivity, creativity and innovation and, in the process, benefit society as a
whole.  However, when the costs of an activity are not fully internalized, then private agreements and legal rules
may seek to constrain individual greed for the benefit of specified groups or society generally. [FN32]
  Because employers recognize the potential for incentive-based compensation as a motivating device, most traders,
like salespersons in many other fields, are paid based on production levels.  The proprietary trader thus has available
a large amount of the firm's resources that he can use to maximize his own bonus compensation.  If he leverages
those resources and takes large risks, his reward is potentially greater.  Of course, if his trades are unsuccessful, this
leverage and risk means that his losses will be greater, resulting in reduced compensation or job loss.  However,
reduced compensation and loss of esteem and/or employment inevitably result for traders who do not earn money
for the firm or *310 who underperform relative to other traders, even if low levels of leverage or risk are pursued.
Accordingly, there is much to be gained on the upside and little to be lost on the downside from incurring greater
risk. [FN33]  Similar theories have been offered by other researchers after finding that subjects incur more risk when
playing with "house money" rather than their own money. [FN34]
  The pursuit of money, moreover, is more than the mere pursuit of material wealth.  Instead, it is a pursuit of esteem
and status. [FN35]  We often judge ourselves by reference to those around us, and often with respect to material
wealth.  The perception that those around us are significantly increasing wealth and status, while we remain
stagnant, can easily encourage greater risk-taking in the hope of greater wealth accumulation. [FN36]
  This is particularly true in Wall Street culture.  Trading is an example of what anthropologists sometimes refer to
as "deep play." [FN37]  As stated by Clifford Geertz: "In deep [play], where the amounts of money are great, much
more is at stake than material gain: namely, esteem, honor, dignity, respect-- in a word . . . status." *311[ FN38]
One trader neatly summarized the role of money in esteem seeking: "Money is everything in this business. Whatever
you make is what you're worth." [FN39]
  The connections between esteem, wealth and risk-taking may be even more pronounced if trading floors are
"superstar" environments.  A superstar environment is one in which a disproportionate share of benefits accrue to
the superstar. [FN40]  Standard market examples are music, movies, and sports. In all of these contexts, a
disproportionate amount of the benefits go to the top performers because the products are easy and cheap to
reproduce, one product is an imperfect substitute for another, and customers typically want to consume only a finite
number of goods.  For example, if there are five basketball games on television simultaneously and Michael Jordan
is playing in one, the vast majority of people are likely to watch the Jordan game and not the others (even though the
players in the other games--let us say Kobe Bryant and Shaquille O'Neal--may be only marginally less skilled than
Jordan). [FN41]
  The trading floor may present a similar superstar environment.  As previously discussed, traders highly value
status.  Status, of course, is a relative good.  Returning higher trading profits than other traders not only results in
higher bonuses, but it also confers superstar status on the top producer.  High status brings many benefits.  First, as
previously noted, status itself has a high intrinsic value for traders.  Perhaps equally important, however, firm
management confers benefits on the superstar trader in the *312 form of less scrutiny and oversight. [FN42]  As the
level of scrutiny imposed on the superstar's trades goes down, the superstar's ability to take larger risks (and, as a
result, remain a superstar) increases.
  The peculiar nature of this tournament-like structure, then, is not only that the winner reaps the bulk of the rewards,
but also that the winner gets the added benefit of increasing the ease with which he can maintain his superstar status.
[FN43]  In this sense, trading floors are similar to an old-style sports tournament in which the prior year's winner
automatically qualifies for the current year's finals, while the other finalist has to go through a grueling and
exhausting elimination process that necessarily reduces his chances to win in the finals.  The bottom line is that the
system provides both the motive (high status and income) and opportunity (less scrutiny) for the superstar to
maintain his favored position.
  In most employment settings, however, a pure tournament-type structure does not appear to be a feasible incentive
mechanism.  Tournament structures present high risk gambles, in that the rewards for winning are large, but winning
requires a high expenditure of effort and is a low probability event. Because employees are typically assumed to be
risk-averse (especially with respect to their jobs), one would expect that the fear of losing good employees to
competitor firms with more employee-interest-compatible structures would result in employers avoiding these types
of structures. [FN44]  Traders, however, may present a special *313 case.
  Commentators have argued that, although risk preference is not permanently sustainable, individuals may possess
"squiggly" (i.e. with both convex and concave portions) utility curves, meaning that individuals may exhibit risk
preference at certain times and under certain circumstances. [FN45]  The opportunity to gain, or sustain, superstar
trader status may very well lead to at least episodic periods of risk preference among traders. [FN46]  This appears
especially likely when it is remembered that the risk-taking behavior of traders does not mirror that of society at
large.  Instead, only individuals who are comfortable taking large risks are attracted to and are successful in the
trading environment. [FN47]  Unlike many other employment settings, therefore, the tournament structure is a
nearly ideal means of incentivizing production on the trading floor.
B. Competing/Complimentary Explanations
  Although a trader's motivations to evade the firm's risk and loss limits can be adequately explained through a
rational cost-benefit analysis, there are other competing (or complimentary) explanations. [FN48]  A growing body
of literature concerning behavioral *314 finance--the study of the influence of psychology on the behavior of
investors and other financial decision-makers-- highlights further explanations for the risk-taking behavior of
traders. [FN49]  For example, beyond the money itself and the status it confers, many traders may engage in high-
risk trading strategies for the "love of the game." In other words, taking large risks sometimes provides individuals
with a sense of excitement and fulfillment and, accordingly, is just plain fun.  As explained by one trader: "It's not
just the money.  It's the excitement, the chance to test yourself every day." [FN50]  These feelings are similar to the
thrill many gamblers get from placing risky bets and may help account for the success of casinos, lotteries,
racetracks and other gambling venues. [FN51] As one long-term colleague described rogue trader Robert Citron:
"He's competitive, and if he returns a greater rate on short term money than most people, he considers that winning. .
. . It's pride.  It's being above average." [FN52]
  In addition, people, including investors, tend to be overconfident about their abilities. [FN53]  This overconfidence
could lead traders to overestimate their trading skill and, therefore, underestimate the levels of risk they are taking.
This overconfidence is especially evident in rogue trader Robert Citron of Orange County, who, when queried by an
investment banker about the impact of an interest rate increase on the county's portfolio, confidently replied that
interest rates would not increase. [FN54]  When further pressed as to how he knew that interest rates would not rise,
Citron responded: "I am one of the largest investors in America. . . . I know these things." [FN55]
*315 C. Illustrations
  All of these phenomena are visible in some of the most recent rogue trading cases.  Most rogue traders are
extraordinarily successful prior to the ill- fated trades that cause their downfall.  For example, Nick Leeson, Paul
Mozer, Robert Citron, and Joseph Jett were all superstar traders before their unauthorized losses were discovered.
As discussed previously, it makes sense that superstars are more likely to engage in rogue trading for several
reasons.  Superstar traders are more likely than others to take large risks in order to maintain their position relative to
other traders, because they have much more to lose in terms of status and esteem.
  Superstar traders may also be more overconfident.  Evidence indicates that most people operate under an
availability heuristic, meaning that they make decisions about the probability of future events based on the ease with
which past events of that type come to mind. [FN56]  Traders who have been successful in the past are more likely
to believe that their success will continue and feel more comfortable taking riskier positions.  Formerly successful
traders may also suffer more readily from the mistaken belief that because they have been so successful in the past,
any downturn in their fortunes must be temporary and, if hidden from supervisors for a short time, can be made up
through riskier trades.  Finally, as discussed below in Part III.B, traders that have successfully incurred greater risk
in the past are more likely to escape the controls of supervisors and compliance departments. [FN57]  In other
words, not only is the superstar trader himself more likely to be overconfident about his abilities, but his supervisors
and co-workers are also likely to be overconfident about the abilities of a trader that they respect and admire.
III The Employer's Story
  While it is fairly easy to construct a plausible story that explains traders' incentives to evade their employers' risk
and loss limits, the real mystery lies in explaining management's apparent *316 ignorance of or acquiescence in
rogue trading behavior.  It seems that a desire to preserve the firm's viability, reputation, or profits (and thus protect
management's continued employment prospects) would encourage management to implement supervisory and
oversight procedures designed to prevent rogue trading, and we do, in fact, observe extensive and costly compliance
programs apparently designed to deter such conduct.  Yet rogue trading continues.  Why?  Is management incapable
of understanding the forces that give rise to rogue trading?  Is rogue trading simply impossible to eliminate?
  In this Part, I argue that management is not stupid, incompetent, or powerless in the face of rogue trading.  Instead,
the continued existence of rogue trading in financial firms can be attributed to three phenomena.  First, management
has likely made a conscious decision to tolerate some evasion of the firm's risk limits because to do so enhances
management compensation and status.  Second, because the events that lead to rogue trading disasters often involve
serial decision-making and substantial sunk costs, supervisors and others within the rogue trader's firm are prone to
an irrational escalation of commitment.  Finally, because the same factors that encourage rogue trading also promote
profitable trading strategies, management may purposely foster a firm culture that is likely to induce employee rogue
trading.  Although the problems of serial decision-making, sunk costs, and firm culture could be overcome through
increased compliance programs and alterations to the firm's compensation and incentive structure, to do so would be
extraordinarily costly.  Accordingly, I argue in this Part that managers within financial institutions have made a
conscious decision to tolerate some evasion of the firm's risk and loss limits. [FN58]
*317 A. Risk Limit Evasions
  Obviously, all else being equal, firms would prefer that its traders never lose money. [FN59]  Accordingly, it
would seem that firms have many incentives to prevent traders from hiding positions or losses from their
supervisors.  Therefore, it is important at this point to remember that rogue traders may engage in two types of
behavior: the evasion of risk limits and the evasion of loss limits.  It is not terribly difficult to believe that
management may directly benefit from traders, particularly superstar traders, who exceed the firm's risk limits.  If
greater risk equals greater reward, then management may very well have made a conscious decision to permit
successful traders to incur more risk. [FN60]  After all, when the trader earns more money, so do the firm's
shareholders, upper-level management, the trader's supervisors and, perhaps, even other members of his trading
department.  In fact, the claims by some financial institutions' management of ignorance and surprise on discovering
the risky trading strategies adopted by their rogue trader-employees are so incredible, that the most logical
conclusion is that management intentionally cooperated in at least some of the traders' risky gambles. [FN61]
B. Psychology
  It is much harder at first glance to find a rational justification for allowing traders to hide losses or invent profits.
However, research into a particular judgment bias --the irrational escalation of commitment--provides some insight
into the rogue trader phenomenon.  Escalation theory stems from research indicating *318 that people and groups
are prone to a particular type of bias--a tendency to escalate commitment--when faced with a series of decisions,
rather than with an isolated decision. [FN62]
  We face serial decisions and struggle with the issue of when to escalate commitment and when to quit on an almost
daily basis.  For example, you hire and train a new employee who is not performing as expected.  Do you fire her or
invest more time and resources in additional training?  You are down $200 at the blackjack table.  Do you continue
to bet in the hope of breaking even or do you walk away and accept the $200 loss?  In each case, you have a
decision to make as the result of a previous decision for which you feel responsible.  Inevitably, you have already
dedicated time, money, and effort to the initial decision, and now things are not working out as expected.
  Numerous studies have shown that the likely response to such situations is an escalation of commitment to the
previously selected course of action beyond that predicted by rational decision-making models. [FN63]  For
example, Professor B.M. Staw has demonstrated that subjects are more likely to allocate additional funds to a losing
corporate division if they made the initial decision to fund that division than are subjects who are told that the initial
funding decision was made by another executive. [FN64]  The tendency to escalate is particularly evident when an
explanation for failure that is unpredictable and outside the control of the decision-maker can be identified, such as a
market downturn or economic shock. [FN65]  Similarly, studies have found that subjects who made an initial
decision to hire an employee subsequently evaluated that employee's performance higher, provided larger rewards,
and made more favorable forecasts of future performance than did subjects who were not involved in the initial
hiring decision. [FN66]
  *319 Psychologists have identified several causes of escalatory behavior, including perception biases, judgment
biases, and impression management. [FN67]  Perception bias results because people are likely to notice information
that supports their initial decision and to ignore information that contradicts it. [FN68]
  In addition to perception biases, most individuals also suffer from judgment biases.  As a result, any initial loss
from an investment is likely to systematically distort judgment toward continuing the chosen course of action.
[FN69]  A growing body of evidence indicates that individuals are loss averse, meaning that they tend to be risk
averse to positively framed problems and risk seeking to negatively framed problems. [FN70]  Individuals will thus
go to great lengths, including taking higher risk positions and hiding losses, in order to avoid recognizing a loss.
[FN71]  Accordingly, when *320 faced with a serial decision following a losing investment, people do not assess the
new decision from a neutral reference point, but rather from a loss frame, resulting in extreme risk seeking. [FN72]
  According to most economists, this result stems from the decision maker's failure to recognize that the time,
money, and effort already expended are sunk costs that cannot be recovered and that the current decision should be
made by evaluating only the future costs and benefits of the contemplated action. [FN73]  This is true, however,
only if wealth maximization as opposed to utility maximization is the goal. [FN74]  As discussed previously,
decision-makers within trading institutions highly value status. If recognizing a loss results in reduced status, then
accepting higher risk in an attempt to eliminate the loss may be a completely rational attempt to maximize utility,
but not wealth.
  Finally, managing the impressions of those around us contributes to an escalation of commitment. [FN75]
Changing course  midstream is tantamount to a public admission of misjudgment and failure. [FN76]  Accordingly,
psychological studies indicate that subjects who have made an initial commitment to a particular course of action are
likely to provide information to others that confirms *321 their initial decision and fail to provide disconfirming
information. [FN77]  Such behavior is understandable given the high premium that our society places on consistency
and the penalies reserved for decision-makers perceived as indecisive. [FN78]  Each of these tendencies is visible in
the context of recent rogue trading disasters.  Robert Citron of Orange County, for example, was able to compile an
investment portfolio with sufficient levels of risk and leverage to bankrupt the county and then hide his mounting
losses, largely without oversight from county officials, auditors, or voters.  Because Citron delivered high returns for
years, Orange County was able to avoid making the hard choices faced by other counties during this time period,
such as whether to increase local taxes or make cuts in county services. [FN79]  Having elected Citron to office and
then benefitted from his success, few people were willing to question his investment skills or methodology. [FN80]
  For example, the county's board of supervisors was unaware of Citron's investment strategy because it never asked
Citron to provide the monthly reports required under California law. [FN81]  The county auditor's office also failed
to supervise Citron.  Although all other county departments were regularly audited, Citron was audited only once in
the four years prior to the county's bankruptcy. [FN82]  The county's Deputy Chief Controller summed up county
officials' attitude stating, "[w]e presumed [Citron] had the ability since he was--had been a treasurer for a long time,
and he had an outstanding reputation." [FN83]
  One of the few people to question Citron's overconfidence and risky investment strategy was John Moorlach, a
certified public accountant and financial planner who ran against Citron in the 1994 County Treasurer election.
[FN84]  Moorlach based his campaign on criticisms of Citron's heavy reliance on derivatives and leverage, *322 but
the voters took little notice, re-electing Citron by a landslide. [FN85]
  Similar phenomena are evident in the case of Nicholas Leeson of Barings Bank.  Leeson began his career in
Baring's "back office," settling trades for the trading department. [FN86]  He was transferred to Baring's Singapore
office as head of settlements and later became a star trader who earned large bonuses, finally working his way up to
head of trading. [FN87]  Apparently, the sunk costs of Leeson's recruitment and training combined with his image as
a talented trader to blind Baring's management to the true nature of Leeson's positions.  For example, Leeson was
permitted to settle his own trades, despite the fact that it is considered improper procedure to allow one person to
perform both functions, as this increases the possibility that the trader will exceed risk and loss limits. [FN88]  In
addition, because all of Leeson's transactions were in exchange-traded futures contracts, he was required to put up
initial margin and meet margin calls as the value of his investments fell. As Leeson's losing positions grew, the
amounts required to meet his margin calls became huge, yet no eyebrows were raised by Baring's officials, who
continued to send Leeson funds in order to meet the margin calls. [FN89]
  Finally, few people at Barings became suspicious of Leeson, even after rivals at other firms had begun to notice his
increasing positions and his risky, aggressive trading strategy. [FN90]  As Leeson himself described Baring's senior
management, "[T]hey wanted to believe." [FN91]  A similar attitude was expressed in the Price *323 Waterhouse
report prepared for the Singapore Minister for Finance:
    [Baring's] claim that it was unaware that account 88888 existed, and also that the sum of S$1.7 billion which the
Baring Group had remitted to BFS, was to meet the margins required for trades transacted through this account, if
true, gives rise to a strong inference that key individuals of the Baring Group's management were grossly negligent,
or wilfully [sic] blind and reckless to the truth. [FN92]
  Interestingly, this perception bias with regard to Leeson was not limited to officials at Barings, but extended to
SIMEX (Singapore Monetary Exchange) officials as well.  Leeson was by far the largest trader of Nikkei index
futures on the SIMEX and had counseled the exchange with regard to its own settlement procedures. [FN93]
Accordingly, SIMEX officials may have failed to perceive the dangerous risk and leverage of Leeson's positions
relative to Baring's size.
C. Institutional Norms
  Applying theories of individual and group psychology provides some initial insight into why rogue trading occurs,
but does not provide a complete explanation for managements' tolerance of rogue trading behavior.  Despite the
psychological tendency for individuals and groups to escalate commitment to a previously chosen course of action,
preventing rogue trading is not impossible.  Financial institutions could implement compliance and oversight
systems so flawless that every trade was closely monitored and any unauthorized trading would be quickly detected.
However, as with any system, management must perform a cost-benefit analysis when deciding which programs to
implement and which to bypass. [FN94]  An internal control system that detected every incidence of rogue trading
would be extraordinarily expensive to implement. [FN95]
  The expense stems not only from the costs of computer software, reporting systems, and supervisory personnel, but
also from the fact that in order to render traders fully accountable to management, the carefully crafted institutional
norms that enable traders to maximize the firm's profits would have to be altered.  *324 As a result, traders would be
less effective and less profitable.
1. An Introduction to Norms
  The term "norms" has been defined as "informal social regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow because
of an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of external non-legal sanctions, or both." [FN96]  There is some
disagreement about the proper definition of norms.  For example, some theorists define norms to include only
decentralized or informal rules and exclude from the analysis organizational rules. [FN97]  Others consider both
formal organizational and informal obligations as norms, [FN98] and some theorists even include legal obligations
within the definition. [FN99]
  The rogue trader example highlights the importance of distinguishing informal norms from formal organizational
rules. [FN100]  Trading institutions, be they institutional investors, investment banks, or commercial banks, have a
highly-formalized, written set of internal rules and practices that are ostensibly designed to curb rogue trading.
[FN101]  However, the norms discussed in this Article *325 that lead to the rogue trader phenomenon, which I refer
to as "institutional norms," are informal, unwritten codes of conduct that have originated within this highly
structured and centralized environment. [FN102]  One of the most interesting features of these norms is that they
sometimes undermine the organization's formal written rules.
  These informal norms, however, do not--indeed cannot--arise without the consent and cooperation of management.
[FN103]  In other words, despite formal written codes prohibiting traders from exceeding specified risk and loss
limits, management has purposely crafted an incentive structure and firm culture that fosters three general norms
that encourage rogue trading: greed, risk-taking, and independence.  Management fosters these characteristics, not
because rogue trading itself benefits the firm, but because these same norms that give rise to rogue trading also
create successful and profitable traders. [FN104]  A change in firm culture would result in less effective traders and,
therefore, would be extraordinarily costly.  Consequently, management accepts the risk of rogue trading as being
outweighed by the benefits stemming from this system.
2. Financial Institution Norms
  Norms analysis has recently been applied to explain behavior in a stunning variety of contexts, including, among
others, dispute resolution among cattle ranchers [FN105] drug law enforcement policy, [FN106] the growth of anti-
smoking sentiment in the United *326 States, [FN107] and the tendency of lawyers to overstate legal risks to their
clients. [FN108] Although some theorists have also employed norms to analyze business relationships, [FN109]
relatively few legal scholars have specifically studied the formal and informal norms that influence the behavior of
traders and other decision-makers within financial institutions.  This is an unfortunate omission.  If, as argued by
Robert C. Ellickson, "members of a close-knit group develop and maintain norms whose content serves to maximize
the aggregate welfare that members obtain in their workaday affairs with one another," [FN110] then financial
institutions provide a nearly ideal test- tube for evaluating the ability of norms to constrain economically self-
interested actions that do not further the collective best interests of the group.
  Interestingly, it is the rogue trader phenomenon itself that gave rise to some of the most interesting studies of Wall
Street culture and norms.  For example, after the Salomon Brothers rogue trading scandal of August 1991, the SEC
investigated Salomon Brothers and the trading practices at other institutions engaged in government bond trading.
[FN111]  In interviews following the investigation, the SEC Chairman at that time, Richard C. Breeden, noted that
the investigation had uncovered a practice of false statements and phantom records that was "nearly universal in
nature.  Virtually 100 percent of the firms were involved." [FN112]
  *327 Chairman Breeden's comments led at least one economic sociologist to question how a rule violation could
become "universal" among a variety of discrete firms within a market. [FN113]  Believing it unlikely that individual
decision-making could account for such an occurrence, he collected his extensive fieldwork undertaken over the
course of thirteen years, including training as a futures trader, into a fascinating study of the culture, organization
and social forces at work on the trading floor. [FN114]
  Professor Richard McAdams has argued that three conditions are necessary for the development of esteem-based
norms: (1) there must be some consensus regarding the esteem worthiness of engaging in some behavior, (2) there
must be a risk that others will detect such behavior, and (3) both the consensus and risk of detection must be well-
known within the pertinent group. [FN115] All three of these conditions are satisfied with regard to traders in
financial institutions.
  As to the first condition, consensus, Professor McAdams argues that prior to and without respect to the norm,
individuals must have some predefined preferences; in other words, they cannot be completely indifferent to all
behaviors. [FN116]  Only individuals with a particular psychological and personality makeup are attracted to, and
survive in, trading institutions. These individuals tend to be relatively comfortable with taking large risks, and must
have the ability to think and act quickly and to prosper under highly stressful conditions. [FN117]  In addition, the
successful trader is greedy.  In other words, he is attracted to trading by a desire for income and continues to be
motivated by that desire throughout his trading career. Finally, those attracted to a career in trading are typically
independent and entrepreneurial.  They often reject the hierarchy and lack of autonomy that characterizes other
corporate jobs. [FN118]
  As to the second condition, risk of detection, anyone who has ever seen a trading floor recognizes the high risk of
detection in such a setting.  Even senior traders rarely have a separate office.  Instead, traders work side-by- side,
separated by only a small cubicle.  In such an environment, it is extraordinarily likely that deviant *328 behavior
will be observed.  In addition, the bonding that takes place under shared high stress levels increases the likelihood of
"gossip" that will quickly disseminate such information to the group.
  Finally, both the consensus and the risk of detection are highly publicized in the trading environment.  The
socialization of new traders begins with the training program, which typically includes a short period of classroom
training and then a longer period as an intern on the trading floor. [FN119]  The internship normally consists of a
rotation among various departments, in which the trainee performs low-level tasks and attempts to ingratiate himself
with senior traders in the hopes of being offered a permanent position at one of the trading desks. [FN120]  This
"hazing" process is a common socialization method for building homogeneity and group loyalty and is often used,
for example, by the military, fraternities, and secret societies. [FN121] Often, the low status of a new trader
continues until his first big trade, at which point he is finally accepted as part of the group. [FN122]
  During the training program, which may last anywhere from six months to two years, trainees observe and copy
senior traders and learn which behavior is acceptable within the institutional culture. [FN123]  As stated by one
trader: "You watch the guys around you . . . .  I got my post-doctorate degree in the bars, mostly after work, hanging
around with the older guys, letting them beat me up and tell me stories.  Then you begin to see how things work."
[FN124]
  Significantly, neither the institutional culture nor the socialization process is static, but instead changes over time to
reflect market, technological, informational, regulatory, and societal *329 changes. [FN125]  To illustrate, many
older traders indicated in interviews that increased competition, financial innovations, and the deregulatory attitude
of the Reagan administration resulted in a 1980's culture significantly different from pre-1980's norms. [FN126]  In
particular, older traders noted that these changes resulted in a firm culture that ignored specific regulatory or
institutional rules and encouraged more opportunistic behavior. [FN127]
  New traders are thus attracted to the trading environment because of a particular psychological and personality
make-up, but do not arrive at a financial institution as a new recruit and find a cultural blank slate. [FN128]  Instead,
they find a highly structured institutional culture that must be followed if they hope to gain acceptance and win a
place at a trading desk. [FN129]  Eventually, these norms may become internalized, so that they are no longer
experienced as an external shaping force, but as a personal preference that happens to be shared by all group
members. [FN130]
3. Three General Norms: Greed, Risk-Taking, and Independence
  The three most salient institutional norms that arise in the trading environment are greed, risk-taking, and
independence.  First, and most importantly, traders are greedy.  Again, I emphasize that the term is not intended
pejoratively.  Traders have a heightened sense of materialism because the firm's incentive structure is designed
specifically to foster such an attitude.  Unlike jobs in most other fields, there is no real career ladder in the trading
department. [FN131]  The traders' hierarchy tends to consist only of traders who earn more money for the firm
versus traders who earn less. Rather than rewarding good performance with more impressive titles and greater
responsibility, successful traders are rewarded with larger bonuses.
  As previously discussed, competition for wealth is more than a competition for material gain: it is a contest for
status and esteem.  This is particularly true on the trading floor. As stated by *330 one observer: "Money is more
than just a medium of exchange; it is a measure of one's 'winnings.'  It provides an identity that prevails over
charisma, physical attractiveness, or sociability as the arbiter of success and power on the bond trading floor.  The
top-earning trader is king of the mountain." [FN132]
  The compensation structure at most trading institutions, typically based almost exclusively on trading profits
earned in the current fiscal year, also encourages risk-taking, by sending a message to traders that short-term trading
profits will be rewarded, even if incurred at the expense of greater risk- taking. [FN133]  This message is far
stronger and more persuasive than the countervailing message embodied in the firm's written code of conduct, which
forbids traders from exceeding risk and loss limits. [FN134]
  It has long been recognized that the firm's compensation structure is perhaps the most powerful tool at
management's disposal for shaping firm culture. [FN135]  Furthermore, the fact that ill-conceived variable
compensation plans can sometimes produce perverse incentives is not a new discovery. [FN136]  Many consulting
companies, in fact, specialize in crafting compensation policies that mirror or transform institutional culture and
eliminate incentives for conduct that does not further the firm's best *331 interests. [FN137]
  Not only financial institutions, but also regulatory bodies such as the SEC, are well aware of the moral hazard
problem raised by the compensation systems at most financial institutions, which typically pay traders between ten
and twelve percent of their net profits as a bonus. [FN138]  Recent (mostly unsuccessful) attempts by financial
institutions to reformulate traders' compensation packages indicate that firms are aware of the message being sent,
but have found no way to provide disincentives for rogue trading while at the same time fostering incentives and
preferences that lead to the most profitable trading strategies.
  The unsuccessful struggles of Salomon Brothers to revise its compensation system provide a good example.  After
the firm's large trading losses in 1994, Salomon Brothers overhauled its compensation system in an attempt to more
closely align the interests of employees and managers with those of shareholders. [FN139]  Among other reforms,
the plan provided investment bankers, traders, and other employees with as much as half of their pay in Salomon
Brothers stock at a fifteen percent discount. [FN140]  The shares could not be sold for five years. [FN141]  After
announcing the new plan, Salomon lost 20 of its 200 managing directors, including several top traders. [FN142]
The plan was later discontinued. [FN143]
  Finally, traders are expected to be self-reliant and entrepreneurial.  As stated by one trader: "It's a very
entrepreneurial *332 business.  No one is going to help you make money.  They're too busy helping themselves."
[FN144]  As a result of this attitude, traders operate in an independent and often uncooperative environment.
[FN145]  Traders perceive their primary obligation as maximizing the value of their own account and feel little duty
to "oversee" those around them for potential violations of the firm's trading rules. [FN146]
4. A Market for Trading Norms?
  One of the great debates currently raging in norms scholarship is the extent to which collectively efficient norms
can arise absent government regulation. [FN147]  Like many other public goods, norms may be underprovided
because of the tendency for members of the group to free ride on others' enforcement efforts. [FN148]
Consequently, many norms scholars favor government intervention to encourage an efficient level of norms
development. [FN149] Others, however, are skeptical of the extent to which government regulation can improve on
market and cultural processes. [FN150]
  In a new article analyzing markets for norms and norms markets failures, Professor Robert C. Ellickson discusses
the forces giving rise to a change in norms. [FN151]  According to Professor Ellickson, a new norm arises with an
individual change agent, who advances a new norm because he anticipates that, over time, the *333 benefits to him
of the new norm will exceed the costs he incurs in initiating and enforcing a new norm. [FN152] This could be
because the change agent's expected benefits are higher, his expected costs are lower, or both. [FN153]
  For a new norm to emerge, however, cheerleaders are also necessary.  [FN154]  This is because, in order for most
change agents to be induced to enforce a new primary behavior, they must receive some reward from the target
audience. [FN155]  These rewards must be relatively costless for the audience to bestow, however.  Otherwise, the
tendency for enforcers to free ride results in underenforcement.  Accordingly, cheerleaders may reward change
agents with esteem, which costs the cheerleader nothing. [FN156] Alternatively, enforcement may signal to the
target audience--the cheerleaders--that the enforcer possesses some other positive quality, such as trustworthiness.
[FN157]
  Applying these principles to trading norms in financial institutions illustrates the small probability that market
forces could actually affect a change in currently prevailing norms.  First, no private change agent is likely to bear
the costs to enforce a new norm regarding financial institutions' internal control procedures because the benefits to
any single actor are unlikely to exceed the costs of such enforcement.  The high cost of enforcing norms that reduce
rogue trading stems partly from the fact that any deviations from the norm are difficult to detect.  In other words,
outsiders are unable to observe which firms' internal controls are likely to give rise to rogue traders, until a rogue
trading loss large enough to attract public attention occurs.
  Similarly, there is no audience to provide esteem or signaling benefits to the norm entrepreneur.  The shareholders
of publicly held financial institutions are unlikely to act as an audience that encourages a norm change. If, as I have
argued in Part III of this *334 Article, management purposely encourages the norms that give rise to rogue trading
because those norms also enhance trader profitability, then shareholders may not want a change from current norms.
In fact, to the extent that public shareholders tend to be more diversified and hence more risk-seeking than
managers, investors in financial institutions are even more likely than management to value norms that lead to
greater risks, and potentially greater rewards. [FN158]
  The customers of financial institutions are also unlikely to act as an audience that bestows benefits on those firms
that act as norms entrepreneurs. While it is frequently argued that there is a market for fair dealing firms and that
reputations are extraordinarily important to financial institutions, a firm's reputation for providing its customers with
profit opportunities may outweigh any concerns with a firm's reputation for lax internal controls.  For example, most
of Salomon Brothers' customers continued to trade government securities through the firm, even after Salomon
admitted to manipulating the Treasury market and entering false orders in customers' names. [FN159]
Conclusion
  This Article presents some very preliminary ideas regarding rogue trading and represents, in many ways, a
blueprint for future research, rather than a finished project.  Three lines of inquiry, in particular, arise from this
preliminary study.
  First, this Article presents a theory as to why rogue trading has not been eliminated by market forces, despite strong
regulatory incentives for firms to curb the self-interested behavior of traders.  This theory is ripe for empirical study,
similar to that conducted by Lisa Bernstein in connection with the diamond industry and by Tracey Meares in
connection with attitudes toward *335 drug law enforcement. [FN160]  Second, ample literature exists on
conspiracy, cover-up, and rogue behavior within other types of organizations. [FN161]  This literature should be
compared and contrasted with the data I collect on rogue trading.  Third, more research is needed regarding whether
regulatory intervention is necessary or desirable in the rogue trader context.
  I have argued in this Article that, contrary to popular belief, market forces will not eliminate rogue trading
disasters.  This is both because some rogue trading personally benefits firm management and, arguably,
shareholders, and because installing monitoring systems sufficient to overcome common cognitive impediments to
decision-making under risky conditions and altering institutional norms that create profitable--but greedy, risky, and
independent--traders is extraordinarily expensive.  This does not necessarily mean, however, that government
intervention can or should succeed where the market has failed.
  First, many commentators have noted the difficulties and drawbacks associated with regulatory attempts to alter
norms. [FN162] Second, it is not obvious that rogue trading losses are a cause for public concern.  After all, if firm
management has correctly conducted its cost-benefit analysis, then the conditions giving rise to rogue trading are
arguably profitable to the shareholders of financial institutions.  Even if management has erred in estimating the
costs and benefits of current compensation and oversight policies, it could be argued that those managers that are too
incompetent or self-interested to implement shareholder wealth-enhancing norms will soon be replaced by the
market for corporate control or the managerial labor market. [FN163]  Although there is *336 a growing body of
evidence demonstrating inefficiencies in those markets, [FN164] it has also been argued that firms failing to
implement the necessary operational controls to prevent rogue trading disasters that threaten the firms' welfare
should be allowed to fail, weeding out unsuccessful firms in a Darwinian survival of the fittest. [FN165]
  There are, however, at least two reasons that could be advanced in favor of regulation designed to avoid rogue
trading losses.  First, because the costs of rogue trading are not fully internalized by either traders or those in charge
of enforcing trading restrictions, we may be concerned about negative third party effects.  In other words, the
negative effects of rogue trading may impact those within and without the firm who have no control over the trading
decision. [FN166]  For example, non-management employees may suffer from large trading losses or firm
bankruptcy.  Similarly, shareholders, creditors, suppliers or customers can all suffer from a firm's economic
downturn. [FN167]
  These negative externalities, however, are arguably not unique to a firm's trading activities.  For example, a
decision to launch a new product line or marketing campaign or to acquire another *337 company could have
similar negative implications, and yet there are few laws specifically restricting these activities.
  A more common argument advanced in favor of regulating rogue trading is the potential impact of rogue trading
losses on systemic risk. [FN168]  Systemic risk is the danger that a disturbance at one financial institution will
spread to others in a domino effect, or that severe illiquidity will arise as a result of investors' lack of confidence in a
depressed market, impairing the efficient functioning of the financial system and, at the extreme, causing its
complete breakdown. [FN169]
  Whether systemic risk is a legitimate cause for concern, however, is a subject of great debate, which has become
increasingly heated as financial and technological innovations continue to alter the pace and character of investment
activity. [FN170]  Many scholars point to the fact that the financial system has already weathered the failure of
several financial institutions without a systemic crisis and conclude that fears regarding a systemic crisis are
unfounded. [FN171]  To date, however, these failed institutions *338 have been relatively minor players in the
global finance game. [FN172]
  To some extent, the reality of systemic risk may be less important than government and industry perceptions that a
systemic crisis is possible.  In other words, if the federal government is willing to engineer a taxpayer bail- out due
to ill-founded fears of a systemic danger, then this puts United States tax dollars at risk and provides a potential
rationale for preventive regulation. [FN173]  Professor Jonathan R. Macey has made similar arguments regarding
Federal Deposit Insurance, albeit with the intent of arguing against federal regulation. [FN174]
  The answers to these questions are complex and are left unanswered in this Article.  However, I hope to further
explore the issue of systemic risk and the impact of new technologies and financial innovations on systemic risk in
future research.
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